A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory

DOI10.1093/restud/rds047zbMath1405.91027OpenAlexW2121684823MaRDI QIDQ4610588

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Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/241c722956c7e9854f4e2266a6547e0093259588

zbMATH Keywords

Markovbounded recallpurificationsequential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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