What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDS049zbMath1405.91090OpenAlexW3125200106MaRDI QIDQ4610594

Matthias Sutter, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Loukas Balafoutas, Adrian Beck

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3461.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcredence goodsfrauddistributional preferencesnatural field experimentexpert servicestaxi rides

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (7)

Exploiting the guilt aversion of others: do agents do it and is it effective? ⋮ Bribing the Self ⋮ Honesty in the city ⋮ Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods ⋮ Competitive equilibrium fraud in markets for credence-goods ⋮ Liability and reputation in credence goods markets ⋮ Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information

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