Efficient Allocations in Dynamic Private Information Economies with Persistent Shocks: A First-Order Approach

DOI10.1093/restud/rds045zbMath1405.91355OpenAlexW2110287235MaRDI QIDQ4610600

Marek Kapička

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds045

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachprivate informationpersistent shocks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Economics of information (91B44)

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