Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*

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Publication:4610616

DOI10.1093/restud/rdt020zbMath1405.91063OpenAlexW3123860814MaRDI QIDQ4610616

Chris Edmond

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/26055




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