Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
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Publication:4610616
DOI10.1093/restud/rdt020zbMath1405.91063OpenAlexW3123860814MaRDI QIDQ4610616
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/26055
Related Items (27)
Collective action: experimental evidence ⋮ Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation ⋮ Public information and global games with strategic complements and substitutes ⋮ News media and delegated information choice ⋮ Vanguards in revolution ⋮ Censorship as optimal persuasion ⋮ Information acquisition in global games of regime change ⋮ Extremism in revolutionary movements ⋮ Optimal overconfidence in the presence of information manipulation ⋮ Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction ⋮ Information quality and crises in regime-change games ⋮ Global manipulation by local obfuscation ⋮ Coordination and social learning ⋮ Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective ⋮ Overthrowing the dictator: a game-theoretic approach to revolutions and media ⋮ A dynamic model of censorship ⋮ Computational Efficiency in Multivariate Adversarial Risk Analysis Models ⋮ Repeated coordination with private learning ⋮ The role of large players in global games with strategic complements and substitutes ⋮ Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty ⋮ Regime change in large information networks ⋮ Creating confusion ⋮ Propaganda and credulity ⋮ Regime change games with an active defender ⋮ Rollover risk and stress test credibility ⋮ Information manipulation and competition ⋮ Overcoming inefficient lock-in in coordination games with sophisticated and myopic players
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