Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study
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Publication:4610621
DOI10.1093/restud/rdt010zbMath1405.91318OpenAlexW3124301644WikidataQ55881417 ScholiaQ55881417MaRDI QIDQ4610621
Eva I. Hoppe, Patrick W. Schmitz
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44240/1/MPRA_paper_44240.pdf
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