Candidates, Credibility, and Re-election Incentives

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDT014zbMath1405.91161OpenAlexW3124515355MaRDI QIDQ4610626

Richard Van Weelden

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt014

zbMATH Keywords

rent-seekingpolitical competitionendogenous candidatesrepeated electionsdivergent platforms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (9)

Competitive elections, incumbency advantage, and accountability ⋮ Private agenda and re-election incentives ⋮ Inequality, participation, and polarization ⋮ Two-party competition with persistent policies ⋮ Extreme parties and political rents ⋮ The welfare implications of electoral polarization ⋮ Representative voting games ⋮ Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions ⋮ Learning about challengers

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