Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDT021zbMath1405.91293OpenAlexW1987611085MaRDI QIDQ4610628

Mehmet Ekmekci, Alp E. Atakan

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt021

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingsearchreputationdynamic matchingwar-of-attrition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (7)

Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance? ⋮ Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market ⋮ Bargaining under almost complete information ⋮ Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility ⋮ Prices versus auctions in large markets ⋮ The bargaining trap ⋮ The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types

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