Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDT022zbMath1405.91156OpenAlexW2104571450MaRDI QIDQ4610643

Jean-Robert Tyran, Louis Putterman, Thomas Markussen

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt022

zbMATH Keywords

experimentvotingcooperationpunishmentformal sanctionsinformal sanctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence ⋮ Alleviation and sanctions in social dilemma games ⋮ Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule ⋮ Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging ⋮ Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? ⋮ Peers or police?: the effect of choice and type of monitoring in the provision of public goods ⋮ The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting ⋮ Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice ⋮ Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma ⋮ Endogenous authority and enforcement in public goods games

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