Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts, and Risk: Evidence from Procurement

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDU002zbMath1405.91189OpenAlexW3121172188MaRDI QIDQ4610681

Patrick Bajari, Gregory M. Lewis

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17647.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardincentive contractsprocurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (3)

Robust contracting with additive noise ⋮ How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects ⋮ The effect of risk aversion on the optimal project resource rate

This page was built for publication: Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts, and Risk: Evidence from Procurement