Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions

DOI10.1093/restud/rdu023zbMath1405.91224OpenAlexW1549789182MaRDI QIDQ4610687

Marek Weretka, Peter Cramton, Marek Pycia, Marzena Rostek, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu023

zbMATH Keywords

multi-unit auctionstreasury auctionselectricity auctionsdemand reduction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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