Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
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Publication:4610699
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDU019zbMath1405.91017OpenAlexW2149307308MaRDI QIDQ4610699
Thomas Tröger, Tymofiy Mylovanov
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu019
Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values ⋮ Informed seller with taste heterogeneity ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals ⋮ An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values ⋮ Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers ⋮ Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability ⋮ Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information ⋮ Selling with evidence
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