Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDU034zbMath1405.91317OpenAlexW2149014638MaRDI QIDQ4610713

Klaus M. Schmidt, Fabian Herweg

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100485

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsreference pointsrenegotiationbehavioural contract theoryemployment contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (4)

Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence ⋮ Are individuals more generous in loss contexts? ⋮ A tale of two bargaining solutions ⋮ Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions

This page was built for publication: Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation