History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms

DOI10.1093/restud/rdu039zbMath1405.91013OpenAlexW3125894306MaRDI QIDQ4610716

Daron Acemoglu, Matthew O. Jackson

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66949

zbMATH Keywords

historyoverlapping generationsexpectationssocial normsrepeated gamescooperationcoordinationleadership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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