Bargaining and Reputation: An Experiment on Bargaining in the Presence of Behavioural Types

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDU029zbMath1405.91228OpenAlexW2097704100MaRDI QIDQ4610720

Guillaume R. Fréchette, Matthew Embrey, Steven F. Lehrer

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/57995/1/MS17213manuscript.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentbargainingreputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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