Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights
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Publication:4610729
DOI10.1093/restud/rdv003zbMath1405.91233OpenAlexW2246835656MaRDI QIDQ4610729
Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2014-045.pdf
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