Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
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Publication:4610741
DOI10.1093/restud/rdv018zbMath1405.91242OpenAlexW2291919539MaRDI QIDQ4610741
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv018
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching ⋮ Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation ⋮ Robust Incentives for Teams ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization ⋮ Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices ⋮ Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
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