The Sunk-Cost Fallacy in Penny Auctions

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDV037zbMath1405.91223OpenAlexW2202954347MaRDI QIDQ4610760

Ned Augenblick

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv037

zbMATH Keywords

market designsunk costsinternet auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Surplus dissipating equilibria in the dollar auction ⋮ Price reveal auctions ⋮ Positively correlated choice ⋮ Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction ⋮ Inference for first-price auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong's estimator ⋮ Trait-Augmented Games with Limited-Skill Agents

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