First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics
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Publication:4610829
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDW007zbMath1405.91445OpenAlexW3122809310WikidataQ113436863 ScholiaQ113436863MaRDI QIDQ4610829
Stephen Hansen, Michael McMahon
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1074.pdf
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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