Estimating Strategic Models of International Treaty Formation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDV054zbMath1405.91394OpenAlexW3123879201MaRDI QIDQ4610833

Ulrich J. Wagner

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv054

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamestructural estimationstrategic interactioninternational relationsinternational environmental agreementbilateral investment treatypreferential trade agreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Trade models (91B60) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (2)

A new model for interdependent durations ⋮ Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements

This page was built for publication: Estimating Strategic Models of International Treaty Formation