Optimal Voting Rules

DOI10.1093/restud/rdw044zbMath1405.91154OpenAlexW1757855250MaRDI QIDQ4610839

Alex Gershkov, Xianwen Shi, Benny Moldovanu

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw044

zbMATH Keywords

generalized mediandominant strategy implementationsingle-crossing preferencessequential voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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