A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDW024zbMath1405.91237OpenAlexW3020863709MaRDI QIDQ4610841

David Martimort, Lars Stole, Aggey Semenov

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/970cebdab63ed07f6bfc42e5a70c83d6ba250444

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationdynamic contractsenforcementbreach of contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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