Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDW061zbMath1405.91058OpenAlexW2565028248MaRDI QIDQ4610850

Siyang Xiong, Eduardo Faingold, Alfredo Di Tillio, Yi-Chun Chen

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/files/93354802/2016_08_10_impact.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessrationalizabilitygames with incomplete informationhigher-order beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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