Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity

DOI10.1093/restud/rdw060zbMath1405.91737OpenAlexW3021065424MaRDI QIDQ4610855

Miguel Faria-e-Castro, Joseba Martinez, Thomas Philippon

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21201.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

fiscal capacitystress testBayesian persuasionbailouts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economics of information (91B44) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

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