Signaling Private Choices

DOI10.1093/restud/rdx012zbMath1405.91066OpenAlexW3123774632MaRDI QIDQ4610892

Younghwan In, Julian Wright

Publication date: 23 January 2019

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx012

zbMATH Keywords

invariancecommitmentimperfect informationsignalling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Related Items (6)

Imperfect recognizability and coexistence of money and higher-return assets ⋮ Counterfeiting, screening and government policy ⋮ Signaling covertly acquired information ⋮ Trustworthy by design ⋮ Signaling games with endogenous types ⋮ Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information

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