Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4612461
DOI10.3982/TE2547zbMath1419.91524OpenAlexW2898331662WikidataQ129005789 ScholiaQ129005789MaRDI QIDQ4612461
Lars Ehlers, Alexander Westkamp
Publication date: 31 January 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2547
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (4)
A market design approach to job rotation ⋮ Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities ⋮ School choice with preference rank classes ⋮ On two mechanisms in job rotation problems
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Efficient priority rules
- Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
- Kidney Exchange
- The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
This page was built for publication: Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
