Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
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Publication:4612466
DOI10.3982/TE2834zbMath1419.91203OpenAlexW2898209809WikidataQ129049465 ScholiaQ129049465MaRDI QIDQ4612466
Publication date: 31 January 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2834
Related Items (10)
A Manipulation Game Based on Machiavellian Strategies ⋮ The perils of friendly oversight ⋮ Private Bayesian persuasion ⋮ Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations ⋮ Global manipulation by local obfuscation ⋮ Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers ⋮ Pivotal persuasion ⋮ Voting with public information ⋮ Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying ⋮ Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee
Cites Work
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- An inequality for the weights of two families of sets, their unions and intersections
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
- Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion.
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- Deliberation and Voting Rules
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