Bargaining With Asymmetric Information: An Empirical Study of Plea Negotiations

DOI10.3982/ECTA12974zbMath1420.91122OpenAlexW2596455395MaRDI QIDQ4612502

Bernardo S. Silveira

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12974

zbMATH Keywords

nonparametric identificationstructural estimationplea bargainingbargaining modelsnonparamteric estimationsettlement models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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