Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
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Publication:4612503
DOI10.3982/ECTA14165zbMath1420.91083OpenAlexW2596496529MaRDI QIDQ4612503
Publication date: 31 January 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14165
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
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