Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information

DOI10.3982/ECTA10946zbMath1419.91424OpenAlexW2141120902MaRDI QIDQ4613391

James M. Malcomson

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10946

zbMATH Keywords

private informationratchet effectdynamic enforcementrelational incentive contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (4)

Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types ⋮ (Bad) reputation in relational contracting ⋮ The curse of long horizons ⋮ The ratchet effect: a learning perspective

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