A Polynomial Optimization Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

DOI10.3982/ECTA11351zbMath1419.91229OpenAlexW3121502824MaRDI QIDQ4614275

Karl Schmedders, Philipp Renner

Publication date: 30 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11351

zbMATH Keywords

first-order approachprincipal-agent modelmoral hazardpolynomial optimization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Nonconvex programming, global optimization (90C26) Nonlinear programming (90C30)

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