Large Matching Markets as Two-Sided Demand Systems
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Publication:4614279
DOI10.3982/ECTA12299zbMath1419.91533MaRDI QIDQ4614279
Publication date: 30 January 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
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