Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria

DOI10.3982/ECTA11048zbMath1419.91022OpenAlexW1731762369MaRDI QIDQ4614280

Roger B. Myerson, Joergen W. Weibull

Publication date: 30 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11048

zbMATH Keywords

normconventionconsideration setsettled equilibriumtenable block

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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