A Dynamic Reinterpretation of Nash Bargaining With Endogenous Threats

DOI10.3982/ECTA11711zbMath1419.91073OpenAlexW2141021796MaRDI QIDQ4614301

David G. Pearce, Dilip Abreu

Publication date: 30 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11711

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionrepeated gamesstochastic gamescontractsNash bargainingendogenous threats

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games ⋮ Reasonable Nash demand games ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games ⋮ Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases ⋮ Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game

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