Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism

DOI10.3982/ECTA12131zbMath1419.91320arXiv1403.6413MaRDI QIDQ4614303

Alessandro Chiesa, Zeyuan Allen Zhu, Silvio Micali

Publication date: 30 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.6413

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete preferencesKnightian uncertaintyimplementation in undominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (4)

Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions ⋮ Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets ⋮ On the indifference relation in Bewley preferences ⋮ Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction

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