Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

DOI10.3982/ECTA12182zbMath1419.91080MaRDI QIDQ4614305

Nicolas Vieille, Satoru Takahashi, Johannes Hörner

Publication date: 30 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremBayesian games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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