Promotion, Turnover, and Compensation in the Executive Labor Market
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Publication:4614320
DOI10.3982/ECTA11020zbMath1419.91421OpenAlexW1481520975MaRDI QIDQ4614320
Robert A. Miller, George-Levi Gayle, Limor Golan
Publication date: 30 January 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11020
identificationasymmetric informationmoral hazardstructural estimationsequential equilibriumexecutive compensationagency costcareer concerncompensating differentialfirm-size pay differential
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