Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation

DOI10.3982/ECTA13925zbMath1420.91355WikidataQ108879913 ScholiaQ108879913MaRDI QIDQ4614969

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Joshua D. Angrist, Parag A. Pathak, Yusuke Narita

Publication date: 1 February 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

instrumental variablescausal inferencepropensity scoreunified enrollmentcharter schools

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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