Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
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Publication:4615853
DOI10.3982/ECTA11183zbMath1457.91273OpenAlexW2101334101MaRDI QIDQ4615853
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, Qing-Min Liu
Publication date: 29 January 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11183
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