Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
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Publication:4615855
DOI10.3982/ECTA10269zbMath1419.91147OpenAlexW2130359158MaRDI QIDQ4615855
Juuso Toikka, Alessandro Pavan, I. R. Segal'
Publication date: 29 January 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10269
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Generalized stochastic processes (60G20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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