Dynamic Financial Constraints: Distinguishing Mechanism Design From Exogenously Incomplete Regimes

DOI10.3982/ECTA9126zbMath1419.91373OpenAlexW1751122322WikidataQ34213797 ScholiaQ34213797MaRDI QIDQ4615867

Robert M. Townsend, Alexander K. Karaivanov

Publication date: 29 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9126

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designfinancial constraintsstructural estimation and testing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to actuarial sciences and financial mathematics (62P05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

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