MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL‐LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM*

DOI10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00710.xzbMath1420.91358OpenAlexW1584257265MaRDI QIDQ4620029

Onur Kesten, Pablo Guillen

Publication date: 7 February 2019

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2123/7220

zbMATH Keywords

school choicekidney exchangeGale-Shapley mechanismindivisible good allocationon-campus housing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

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