HOW MANY FIRMS SHOULD BE LEADERS? BENEFICIAL CONCENTRATION REVISITED*

DOI10.1111/J.1468-2354.2012.00722.XzbMath1420.91250OpenAlexW2102005575MaRDI QIDQ4620048

Toshihiro Matsumura, Hiroaki Ino

Publication date: 7 February 2019

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp48.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

welfareCournot modelHerfindahl-Hirschman indexmultiple-leader Stackelberg models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Comparison between specific taxation and volume quotas in a free entry Cournot oligopoly ⋮ An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications ⋮ Asymmetric equilibria under price cap regulation ⋮ Welfare-Improving Effect of a Small Number of Followers in a Stackelberg Model ⋮ Stackelberg versus Cournot: a differential game approach ⋮ Some thoughts on the Sutton approach. Concentration in high-tech markets ⋮ Free entry under an output-cap constraint ⋮ Privatization neutrality theorem in free entry markets

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