CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE MONETARY INSTRUMENT PROBLEM

DOI10.1111/iere.12027zbMath1420.91343OpenAlexW1549846969MaRDI QIDQ4620110

Paul Pichler, Stefan Niemann, Gerhard Sorger

Publication date: 7 February 2019

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/2902/1/dp687.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic noncooperative gameinterest rate policydiscretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makersmonetary instrumentsmoney growth policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Interest rates, asset pricing, etc. (stochastic models) (91G30) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (1)

Discretionary monetary policy in the Calvo model

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