ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT POLICY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE

DOI10.1111/iere.12028zbMath1420.91373OpenAlexW2225016790MaRDI QIDQ4620111

Kazuharu Kiyono, Jota Ishikawa

Publication date: 7 February 2019

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://gcoe.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/research/discussion/2008/pdf/gd11-204.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

subgame-perfect Nash equilibriaemission taxesgreenhouse-gas emissionsnoncooperative regulationtax-quota equivalencetwo-stage policy choice game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic game of international pollution control with general oligopolistic equilibrium: Neary meets Dockner and Long

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