TAX COMPETITION, RELATIVE PERFORMANCE, AND POLICY IMITATION

DOI10.1111/IERE.12035zbMath1420.91350OpenAlexW2232837901MaRDI QIDQ4620121

Andreas Wagener

Publication date: 7 February 2019

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2723.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitygame with infinitely many playersgovernments in fiscal competitionstandard tax competition game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations ⋮ International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries ⋮ Irrelevance of the strategic variable in the case of relative performance maximization

This page was built for publication: TAX COMPETITION, RELATIVE PERFORMANCE, AND POLICY IMITATION