New Approximations for Coalitional Manipulation in Scoring Rules

DOI10.1613/jair.1.11335zbMath1454.91077OpenAlexW2913992584WikidataQ128469177 ScholiaQ128469177MaRDI QIDQ4621488

Noam Hazon, Orgad Keller, Avinatan Hassidim

Publication date: 12 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.11335

zbMATH Keywords

social choicescoring rulecoalitional manipulationBorda protocol

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Social choice (91B14)

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