Bertrand equilibria and efficiency in markets for congestible network services
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Publication:462340
DOI10.1016/J.AUTOMATICA.2013.12.020zbMath1298.93356OpenAlexW2118110649MaRDI QIDQ462340
Publication date: 20 October 2014
Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2013.12.020
Noncooperative games (91A10) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Optimal stochastic control (93E20) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)
Related Items (3)
Strategic Arrivals into Queueing Networks: The Network Concert Queueing Game ⋮ Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers ⋮ Congestion control for a system with parallel stations and homogeneous customers using priority passes
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