Strategy-proofness in the Large
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Publication:4627463
DOI10.1093/restud/rdy042zbMath1409.91115OpenAlexW2907724681MaRDI QIDQ4627463
Eduardo M. Azevedo, Eric B. Budish
Publication date: 11 March 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w23771.pdf
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