Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism

DOI10.3982/ECTA13615zbMath1419.91520MaRDI QIDQ4628436

Paulo Somaini, Nikhil Agarwal

Publication date: 13 March 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

identificationschool choicepreference estimationmanipulable mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

Improving the Chilean College Admissions System ⋮ How well do structural demand models work? Counterfactual predictions in school choice ⋮ Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse ⋮ On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules ⋮ High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab ⋮ Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition ⋮ College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion

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