Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.06.006zbMath1308.91035OpenAlexW2157823406MaRDI QIDQ462863
Publication date: 22 October 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.06.006
incomplete informationBertrand duopolyex-post regret heuristicsfirst-price and second-price auctionsfixed and random matchingminimax regret equilibrium
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (5)
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